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SEX CLASSIFICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFIT STRUCTURE
The social security program, providing social insurance protection
against old age, death and disability (OASDI),' has assumed increasing
national importance in the last two decades, both in terms of revenue
collected by payroll taxes and benefits paid.2 The program's benefits are
distributed according to family relationship. A worker receives benefits
as the primary breadwinner, and wives, children, parents and a few hus-
bands receive benefits as dependents. Since the benefit structure is rooted
in traditional assumptions regarding family roles, the dependents' bene-
fits are largely defined in terms of sex. Although some of Social Security's
distinctions based on sex have been eliminated over the years, differentials
remain in the dependent wife's, widow's, mother's, husband's, and
widower's benefit provisions.'
With recent developments in the constitutional doctrines of equal
protection and due process, the courts have indicated a greater willingness
to carefully evaluate and strike down classifications based on sex. Social
Security's sex-linked benefit structure may now be vulnerable to attack.
The future of Social Security may include not only reforms which
will equalize existing benefit programs, but also reforms which will
broaden the system's coverage.4 Since its initial adoption, the social
security system has been expanded as societal views on the purpose of the
program and those whom it should protect have changed. With the cur-
rent reexamination of women's roles and Social Security's impact on
1. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§
401-29 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972) [hereinafter referred to as OASDI or So-
cial Security]. This note will not include any discussion of the health insurance bene-
fits of social security, known as Medicare.
2. In 1971 social security payroll tax revenue reached 44 billion dollars, a growth
from 4% of total federal revenue in 1949 to 23% in 1971. J. BRIrrAiN, THE PAaOLL
TAx FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BRiTTAiN]. At the end of No-
vember, 1972, monthly cash benefits reached nearly 3.9 billion dollars. These benefits
were paid to more than 28.3 million beneficiaries, health benefits included. 36 Soc. SEC.
BULL., Mar., 1973, at 1.
3. These differentials and social security's impact on women have become increas-
ing concerns among those interested in improving women's social and economic status.
See CITIZENS' ADvISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE TASm
FORCE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES (1968) [hereinafter cited as CITIZENS' COUN-
cIL]; HEW, REPORT OF THE WOMEN'S AcrION PROGRAM 85-93 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as HEW REPORT]; NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, NOW GOALS (1973) ; THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON TEE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF TE COMMITTEE ON So-
CIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES (1963) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
4. See pp. 197-199 infra.
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women, OASDI's primary protection of workers may eventually be ex-
tended to those, either men or women, now considered dependents who
work at home without pay rather than in the labor force.
CURRENT OASDI BENEFIT PROVISIONS
The concept of the family embodied in the Social Security Act5
has evolved over time, but the basic assumption that men are the bread-
winners supporting dependent women has remained. This traditional
notion of proper sex roles is exemplified by the fact that wives and widows
are presumed to be dependent on male workers, whereas husbands and
widowers must prove their dependence. The worker's benefit itself has
been designed with the male breadwinner model in mind.
Benefits for Workers
Under the original Act, the worker was the only beneficiary.' To-
day, the worker is the primary beneficiary, but dependents receive some
benefits from the worker's Primary Insurance Amount (PIA).' To
receive protection as a worker, a person must have worked for a sub-
stantial period of time in employment covered by OASDI.' The program
applies only to those who work for pay since benefits are calculated on the
basis of an average monthly wage.'
Female and male workers' benefits have been calculated differently
because the Act has assumed that the family breadwinner is a man. This
differential treatment began in 1956 when women became eligible for
benefits at age 62.1" The provision was designed to allow nonworking
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-29 (1970), as amended (Supp. 11, 1972) [hereinafter referred
to as the Act]. "The Act" is used interchangeably with "OASDI" and "Social Secur-
ity." See note 1 supra.
6. Social Security Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 202, 49 Stat. 623.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
8. This substantial period of time is called "a quarter of coverage." A "quarter
of coverage" means a three month period in which the individual has received at least
$50 in wages in covered employment or has received at least $100 of self-employment
income. 42 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1970). To be "fully insured" under OASDI, a person
must have at least one quarter of coverage per year from age 21 (or 1950, whichever is
later) until the year in which she or he dies or reaches age 62, or a total of 40 quarters
of coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
Social Security now cover 90% of workers in paid employment. Those not work-
ing in covered employment include federal civilian employees, certain employees of state
and local government, and self-employed farmers who are voluntarily excluded from
coverage. The remaining workers not receiving coverage are ineligible because of in-
sufficient earnings, such as some domestic workers, farmworkers, self-employed farmers,
nonfarm self-employed, and employees of nonprofit organizations. 36 Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Mar., 1973, at 75 (Table Q-2, figures for Sept., 1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1970).
10. Social Security Amendments of August 1, 1956, ch. 836, §§ 102(a), (c), 70
Stat. 809, amwnding 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 416 (1952) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(q),
wives to receive benefits at an earlier age in order to ease the financial
strain on a married couple when the husband retired at age 65.1 Al-
though aimed at dependent wives, all women were allowed to take ad-
vantage of the provision, thereby encouraging the earlier retirement of
working women. The early retirement provision was extended to men
in 1961,12 but the benefit-computation point used in determining the PIA
was not reduced from age 65 to age 62 for men as it had been for women."8
Thus, for men any year of retirement between age 62 and age 65 was con-
sidered a year of low earnings in calculating the average monthly wage.
This calculation resulted in lower benefits for men than for women with
the same average earnings over their working years, 4 and gave men a
considerable incentive not to take advantage of early retirement. The
1972 amendments to OASDI provided for gradual elimination of this
sex-based age differential over the next three years. 5
By 1975 Social Security will give men the same incentive as
women to retire at age 62, but it is likely that a larger proportion of
women than men will continue to retire early, due to broader societal pres-
sures. Women traditionally have been encouraged or even forced to re-
tire at earlier ages than men although' their greater life expectancy would
suggest an opposite policy.'6 Although early retirement has been seen
416(a) (1970)). In 1965, widows became eligible for reduced benefits at age 60. Social
Security Amendments of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 307(a), 79 Stat. 373,
as amended 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1970). Early retirement benefits are permanently re-
duced to take into account the longer period over which they will be paid. 42 U.S.C. §
402(q) (Supp. II, 1972).
11. Wives were believed to be characteristically several years younger than their
husbands. Bixby, Women and Social Security in the United States, 35 Soc. SEc. BULL.,
Sept., 1972, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Bixby].
12. Social Security Amendments of June 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 102(a),
75 Stat. 131, amending 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1958) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), (c),
(f) (1970)).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 414(a) (1), 415(b) (3) (1970).
14. In Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968), a male plaintiff chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the sex classification in these provisions. His primary
insurance amount at age 62 of $100.60 was reduced by 20% to $80.50 because of early
retirement. A woman, with a history of equal earnings and retiring at age 62, would
have had a PIA of $115.60, reduced to $92.50 because of early retirement. In her case,
the three years from age 62 to age 65 would be ignored in computing benefits. In the
man's case, those three years are included as three years of low earnings in the compu-
tation of an average monthly wage, resulting in a lower PIA.
15. Social Security Amendments of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§
104(a), (b), 86 Stat. 1340, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 414, 415 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 414(a), 415(b) (3) (Supp. II, 1972)). The provisions giving the effective dates of
the 1972 amendments to 42 U.S.C. §§ 414, 415 (Supp. II, 1972), specify that in 1973
men's benefits will be computed using age 64, in 1974 using age 63, and in 1975 the com-
putation point for both men and women will be age 62. Id. § 414 (effective date of 1972
amendments).
16. HEW RPoRT, supra note 3, at 86.
SEX CLASSIFICATIONS 183
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
as an advantage for women, it reflects a view that women are secondary
workers. The social security system has reinforced this tradition by mak-
ing early retirement more attractive for women than for men. In addi-
tion, the early retirement provisions, with permanently reduced benefits,
have resulted in a greater proportion of women beneficiaries receiving
significantly lower benefits throughout their remaining years.
The male breadwinner model reflected in the worker's benefit struc-
ture suffers from a two-fold limitation. On the one hand, a majority of
women between the ages of 18 and 65 now work.' Working wives,
many with dependent children, are a substantial proportion of the labor
force, and an increasing number of married women are the primary bread-
winners in their families.' 9 On the other hand, because Social Security
only covers work for pay," the many women who continue to work at
home or as volunteers in the community are denied primary coverage as
workers. This results in a larger proportion of men than women receiv-
ing the higher worker's benefit.2"
Benefits for Dependent Women and Men
More women receive social security benefits as dependent wives,
widows and mothers than as workers.22 The retirement benefit for
17. In June, 1972, 61.2% of female retired workers were receiving reduced benefits,
compared to 40% for male retired workers. The average monthly reduced benefit for
women was $106. The average monthly reduced benefit for men was $131. For women
the average worker's benefit without reduction was only $128 compared to $158 for men.
35 Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec., 1972, at 74 (Table Q-5).
18. In May, 1973, 51.5% of women age 20-64 were in the labor force; 53.9% of
those age 18 and 19 were in the labor force. 19 EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS, June, 1973,
at 24 (Table A-3). In 1950, only 37.2% of women age 18-64 were working. DEP'T OF
LABOR, WOMEN's BUREAU, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 22 (1969) (Table 6) [here-
inafter cited as HANDBOOK].
19. Women age 20 and over made up 34% of the civilian labor force in 1972. 96
MONTHLV LAB. REV., Sept., 1973, at 105 (Table 4). 78.5% of working women in 1967
were married, widowed, or divorced. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 23 (Table 7). The
number of working wives increased by 4.1 million between 1962 and 1969, 40% of the
period's total labor force increase. 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug., 1972, at 11. In 1971,
59% of women workers were married and one-third of working women had both a hus-
band and dependent children. 95 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Apr., 1972, at 9. Of the 44 mil-
lion husband-wife families in 1970, wives were the main income recipients in 3.2 million
families, 7.4% of the total. In 1960, the percentage was 5.7. CENSUS BUREAU, SOURCES
AND STRUCTURE OF FAMILY INCOME 377 (1973) (Table 9).
20. See note 9 supra & text accompanying.
21. In June 1972, 8,072,238 men were receiving monthly benefits. Of these men,
99.9% received benefits as retired workers. At the same time, 13,111,337 women were
receiving monthly benefits, but only 47% of these women received benefits as retired
workers. 35 Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1972, at 74-78 (Tables Q-5 to -10).
Nonrecognition of women's work in the home or community will be explored in the
final section of this note.
22. Of the 13 million women receiving monthly benefits under OASDI in June,
1972, 6,990,000, or 53%, received benefits as dependent wives, mothers or widows. Id.
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wives and the survivor's benefit for widows were added in 1939 with the
presumption that wives are dependent upon their husbands.2" If both a
wife and her husband are retired, she automatically receives a benefit
equal to one-half of her husband's PIA, unless she has worked in covered
employment and her own worker's benefit is greater than her wife's bene-
fit.24 Roughly speaking, if a wife has average earnings over one-third of
her husband's she will not then be considered "dependent" and she will re-
ceive a worker's benefit larger than her dependent's benefit would have
been." A widow, on the other hand, is treated as a dependent unless her
own worker's benefit equals or exceeds her deceased husband's PIA.2"
23. Social Security Amendments of August 10, 1939, ch. 666, §§ 202(b), (d), (e),
53 Stat. 1364-65, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (e), (g) (1970) ; REPORT OF THE So-
cr. SEcuaiTr BD., H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1939). The
wife's benefit was regarded as one way of increasing benefits for workers in the early
years of the system. In 1939 two-thirds of all men over 65 were married. These provi-
sions were designed to account for the greater presumptive need of the married couple,
although proponents of the amendment believed many wives would eventually develop
benefit rights based on their own earnings, thus eventually reducing the cost of the sup-
plemental benefits to a relatively small amount. Hearings on H.R. 6635, the Soial Secur-
ity Amendments of 1939, before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 59 (1939).
Divorced wives, and surviving divorced wives, or "divorced widows," if not re-
married, were included in the wife's and widow's provisions beginning in 1965. They
were not presumed dependent on their ex-spouses. Social Security Amendments of July
30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308, 79 Stat. 375-78, as anmnded 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (e),
416(d) (1970). In order to be eligible, a divorced wife or surviving divorced wife had
to be receiving at least one-half of her support from the primary beneficiary, or receiv-
ing substantial contributions under a written agreement or a court order. In addition,
her marriage to the insured must have lasted for at least twenty years. The support
requirements were eliminated in 1972, so that only the twenty year duration of marriage
requirement remains. Social Security Amendments of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-603, § 114, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 416 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b),
(e), 416(d) (Supp. 11, 1972)).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b) (1) (E), (2) (1970).
25. For example, if a working wife had an average monthly wage of $200, her PIA
would equal $154.40. If her husband's average monthly wage were three times hers, or
$600, her wife's benefit would equal $154.90, one-half of her husband's PIA of $309.80. If
her average monthly wage were $250, her PIA would equal $174.80; her worker's bene-
fit would be larger and she would no longer receive a dependent wife's benefit. See 42
U.S.C. § 415 (Supp. 11, 1972) (Table for Determining Primary Insurance Amount and
Maximum Family Benefits).
Rather than questioning the dependency presumption, the Report of the 1971 Advi-
sory Council on Social Security made the assumption more explicit and expansive.
[T]he program provides benefits . . . for those of his relatives whom the
worker normally supports or has a legal obligation to support. . . . Benefits
are provided for a wife or widow without a test of support because it is rea-
sonable to presume that a wife or widow loses support, or a potential source of
support, when the husband's earnings are cut off, except in situations where she,
herself, has covered earnings and is eligible for a benefit on her own account
that is larger than her wife's or widow's benefit.
1971 ADVISORY CouxcjL ON SocIAL SEcURITY, REORT 34 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
1971 ADViSORY REPORT]. There is no recognition by the Advisory Council that husbands
lose support, or potential sources of support, when their wives' earnings are cut off.
26. A widow receives a dependent's benefit equal to 100% of her deceased hus-
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The benefits for husbands and widowers offer a stark contrast to
the presumptive dependency benefits for wives and widows. The hus-
band and widower benefits were added in 1950 to allow disabled or other-
wise dependent men to receive benefits in the "rare" case where the pri-
mary breadwinner was the wife." In order to qualify for benefits on
a woman's wage record, a husband or widower must show that he re-
ceived over one-half of his individual support from his wife.28  Since
OASDI assumes that one-half of family expenses are for the husband,
band's PIA. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (2) (A) (Supp. II, 1972). Before the 1972 amend-
ments, a widow received only 75% of her husband's benefit. Social Security Amend-
ments of August 10, 1939, ch. 666, § 202(d) (2), 53 Stat. 1365.
As the Social Security Administration prefers to explain the dependent wife and
widow provisions, if a wife works and then retires, she receives her own benefit in any
case. In addition, if her worker's benefit is low or non-existent, she receives a supple-
mental benefit up to the derivative benefit limits. Bixby, supra note 11, at 5.
Working women have expressed great dissatisfaction with the dependent wife's and
widow's benefits. See CiTIzENS' CoUNcIL, supra note 3, at 67-78, 84-85; PRESmENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 36-39. Under current provisions a married woman who
has worked most of her life may get little or no more in benefits than she would have
gotten had she never worked. Although she has paid social security taxes, she may re-
ceive no additional "return" over what she would have received had she remained a "de-
pendent" wife.
The Social Security Administration is aware of these complaints, but points out
that working women receive advantages for their contributions in the form of insurance
protection against loss of earnings due to disability or death for themselves and their
dependents. Bixby, supra note 11, at 9.
Rather than focusing on the differential treatment of working and nonworking
wives, perhaps emphasis should be placed on the distinction between monetarily-employed
workers, who supposedly have the ability to pay the payroll tax and those who work at
home without financial compensation. In a very crude and indirect way, the social se-
curity system is compensating housewives through the wife's benefits for many years of
unpaid labor.
27. Social Security Amendments of August 28, 1950, ch. 809, § 101(a), 64 Stat.
483, 485 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c), (f) (1970)).
These additional benefits were viewed as establishing parity between the dependents
of working men and women. However, the differential support requirements were vir-
tually ignored. A program analyst for Social Security stated:
The earlier legislation made no provision for benefits to a husband or widower
on a woman's wage record. . . . The 1950 amendments have resolved this in-
equity. The new law retains the concept of deemed dependency of the wife on
the husband, which fits the usual family situation, but it also permits the hus-
band or widower to become a beneficiary on the basis of the wife's wage record
if he has in fact been dependent on her.
Riches, Women Workers and Their Dependents Under the 195o Amendments, 14 SOC.
SEc. BULL., Aug., 1951, at 9, 11 [hereinafter cited as Riches].
28. 42 U.S.C. §8 402(c) (1) (C), (f) (1) (D) (1970). This test of dependency
must be met prior to any calculation of PIA, and support encompasses all income re-
ceived by the couple from whatever source. As explained in Clark v. Celebrezze, 230
F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
817 (1966), one of the few cases litigating a husband's right to benefits, the Social Se-
curity Examiner added together the total family income available for mutual expenses
of the husband and wife, took half as the husband's total support, and took half again
to see if he met the requirement, which he did not. "Support" is defined in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.350(c) (1972) as including food, shelter, clothing, ordinary medical expenses, and
"other ordinary and customary items." Id.
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the wife must have paid at least three-fourths of the total family expenses
for her husband to receive a dependent's benefit. If eligible, a husband will
receive one-half of his wife's PIA, and a widower will recieve a benefit
equal to his wife's PIA. 9
Hostility toward liberalization of benefits for husbands and
widowers continues to be based on the same traditional assumptions re-
garding family roles. The 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security
assumed that all married men work unless disabled, and therefore, they
could not be dependent on their wives." The Council opposed elimina-
tion of the support requirement because of its feeling that men would
receive double benefits financed by the public: benefits from public re-
tirement plans for state or federal employees not covered by OASDI and
benefits from OASDI derived from wives' wage records." Interestingly,
the Council was not concerned about women who presently receive double
benefits. 2
While husbands and widowers have at least a limited opportunity to
draw benefits on their wives' wage records, divorced men, unlike divorced
women, receive no protection under the Act."3 The primary reason for the
inclusion of divorced wives and "divorced widows" in the female benefit
structure was to
provide protection mainly for women who have spent their lives
in marriages that are dissolved when they are far along in
years-especially housewives who have not been able to work
and earn social security benefit protection of their own.34
Since the Advisory Council assumed that men do not stay home and keep
house, 5 they considered the sex-based distinction valid, providing no
opportunity for a divorced man to show he departed from the norm.
The social security system provides further benefits for women with
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c) (3), (f) (3) (1970), as amnended (Supp. II, 1972).
30. 1971 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 25, at 34-35.
31. Id.
32. The Advisory Council stated that dual entitlement for women was not a prob-
lem because the number of wives who work in noncovered employment and who get de-
pendents' benefits even though they are not really dependent is a relatively small propor-
tion of wives receiving dependent benefits. The Council offered no support for this state-
ment. Id. at 35.
33. Divorced husbands and surviving divorced husbands, not remarried, are not in-
cluded in the husband's and widower's benefits as contrasted with divorced women.
See note 23 supra.
34. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 6675, H.R. REP. No.
213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1965), quoted in 1971 ADViSORY REPORT, upra note 25, at
36.
35. 1971 ADvxsoRY REPORT, supra note 25, at 36.
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children."8 A mother's benefit was added in 1950, payable to a wife,
widow or surviving divorced wife under age 65 (now age 62) as long
as she had in her care a child eligible for benefits."r The purpose behind
the mother's benefit was to enable a wife with children to remain at home
and care for them after her husband died, retired, or became disabled."8
No corresponding father's benefit exists.
The system assumes that the death or disablement of the husband-
father will result in a loss of earnings for the family, but does not make the
same assumption regarding the death or disablement of the working wife-
mother.39 Although the 1950 amendments were viewed as a repudiation
36. Provision for wives with children whose husbands retire or become disabled is
made through the wife's benefit. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1) (B) (1970). Provision for wives
with children whose husbands die is made through the mother's benefit. Id. § 402(g) (1).
37. Social Security Amendments of August 28, 1950, ch. 809, § 101(a), 64 Stat.
483, 485-86, amending 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (g)
(1970)). A benefit for a worker's widow with an eligible child in her care was first
added in 1939 under the provision "Widow's Current Insurance Benefits." Social Se-
curity Amendments of August 10, 1939, ch. 666, § 202(e), 53 Stat. 1365. The 1950
amendments changed the benefit title to "Mother's Benefit," extended protection to sur-
viving divorced mothers and, under the wife's benefit, to mothers whose husbands re-
tired or became disabled.
If the husband-father retires or is disabled, the mother's benefit is 50% of his PIA,
42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1) (B), (2) (1970) ; if the husband-father dies the mother receives
75% of his PIA, id. § 402(g) (2).
Children may draw benefits on their parent's wage record. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)
(1970). When the dependent child's benefit was established in 1939, a child was deemed
dependent on the father as long as the father was living with or contributing to the sup-
port of the child. A child was deemed dependent on the mother only if she was the sole
support of the child and the father was no longer living with the child. Social Security
Amendments of August 10, 1939, ch. 666, § 202(c), 53 Stat. 1364. After the 1950
amendments, if the mother was currently insured when she died or reached 65, her chil-
dren were automatically entitled to benefits, assuming they were under the age limita-
tions. If the mother was fully, but not currently insu'ed, the child could receive benefits
only if the mother provided at least one-half of the child's support, or the child was
neither living with nor receiving any support from the father. Social Security Amend-
ments of August 28, 1950, ch. 809, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 484. These limitations on the
benefits available to the children of working women were eliminated in 1967. Social
Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 151, 81 Stat. 860 (1968), amending
42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970)).
38. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, S. Misc. Doc. No. 4,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1939).
39. Because the 1971 Advisory Council conceived of the mother's benefit as giving
a choice to women not to work but to stay home, they saw no reason to extend the
benefit to fathers:
A man generally continues to work to support himself and his children after
the death or disability of his wife. . . . Even though many more married
women work today than in the past, so that they are both workers and home-
makers, very few men adopt such a dual role; the customary and predominant
role of the father is not that of a homemaker but rather that of the family
breadwinner. . . . The Council therefore does not recommend that benefits be
provided for a young father who has children in his care.
1971 ADVISORY REPORT, mtpra note 25, at 35.
A housewife is completely left out of OASDI's primary coverage, and no provision
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of the assumption that women only work for "pin money,"' the lack of
a father's benefit perpetuates the secondary importance of the wife's con-
tribution to the family income.
THE QUESTIONABLE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SOCIAL SECURITY'S SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
The sex classifications which remain in the OASDI benefit struc-
ture are vulnerable to constitutional attack. With recent United States
Supreme Court extensions of equal protection and due process doctrines
in the area of sex discrimination, it is possible that the sex-based statu-
tory scheme of OASDI will be declared void. Private employment bene-
fit plans similar to OASDI have been found to violate title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 In addition, the Equal Rights Amendment
to the United States Constitution,42 if ratified, will necessitate abandon-
ment of the sex-stereotyped benefit structure.
The Effect of Reed and Frontiero on OASDI
Traditionally, in cases challenging legislative classifications based
on sex under the equal protection and due process doctrines,48 the Supreme
Court used the more lenient "rational relationship" test,44 rather than
requiring a showing of "compelling state interest."4 The Court allowed
legislatures to draw sharp lines between the sexes,"8 and found a rational
basis for sex classification in its belief that "[women are] still regarded
as the center of home and family life. ' '4r
exists to help replace her services if she dies or becomes disabled. However, because
women who work outside the home are otherwise covered by the Act, the lack of a
benefit for fathers to replace a working wife's contribution to the family income seems
indefensible.
40. Riches, supra note 27, at 11.
41. See note 79 infra & text accompanying. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1970), as amended (Supp. II, 1972).
42. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ; S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
43. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not directly ap-
plicable to federal legislation such as OASDI, but the concepts surrounding it have been
incorporated by the Supreme Court into the due process clause of the fifth amendment
when reviewing federal action. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
44. E.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971) ; Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485, 487 (1970); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
45. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (affects fundamental interest in interstate move-
ment).
46. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
47. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). In the only reported case to date
attacking a sex classification in OASDI as a violation of equal protection and due
process, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed the traditional rational relation-
ship approach and declared that "special recognition and favored treatment can constitu-
tionally be afforded women." Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591, 592, cert. denied, 393'
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The first break in this traditional approach to sex classification came
in Reed v. Reed.48 In a unanimous decision, the Court struck down an
Idaho statute giving preference to males over females in selecting ad-
ministrators of decedents' estates. The Court held that the sex classifica-
tion was arbitrary and based on criteria wholly unrelated to the objective
of the statute.49 The state's rationale that men as a rule are more con-
versant with business affairs than women"° was implicitly rejected by the
Court. It went on to say that even though the state's interests in achiev-
ing administrative efficiency and avoiding intrafamily controversy are not
without some legitimacy, "the choice in this context may not lawfully be
mandated solely on the basis of sex."'" Although Reed did not declare sex
a "suspect classification," it was viewed by many as the beginning of a
more careful evaluation of sex classifications by the Court. 2
A second shift in the Court's treatment of sex classification came
U.S. 982 (1968). In Gruenwald, the male plaintiff contended that the age differentials
based on sex, in 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (3) (1970), used in computing average monthly
wages were unconstitutional. For the details of these provisions, see notes 12-15 supra.
The provisions were upheld as constitutional because the court felt the sex classification
was not patently arbitrary or utterly lacking in rational justification, and did not involve
invidious discrimination. Because women as a class earn less than men, and their eco-
nomic opportunities in higher age groups are less, the court found a reasonable relation-
ship between the classification and the objective of the provision. This objective, ac-
cording to the court, was to reduce the disparity between the economic and physical
capabilities of men and women. 390 F.2d at 592.
48. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
49. Id. at 74, 76.
50. Brief for Respondent at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
51. 404 U.S. at 77. '
52. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625 (1971), challenging the exemption of women from state juries, declared:
The absolute exemption provided by Louisiana . . . betrays a view of a
woman's role which cannot withstand scrutiny under modern standards ...
Classifications based on sex are no longer insulated from judicial scrutiny by
a legislative judgment that "woman's place is in the home," or that woman is
by her "nature" ill-suited for a particular task.
Id. at 639-41. He then cites Reed. Similarly, Judge Duniway, dissenting in Struck v.
Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971), challenging the Army's regulation
discharging officers who become pregnant, argued that Struck should have been given
a rehearing in light of Reed, and stated: "It is not yet clear whether classification based
upon sex is 'suspect,' . . . . I think, however, that eventually the Supreme Court will
so hold." Id. at 1378. In Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals concluded that § 214 of the Internal Revenue Code,
26 U.S.C. § 214 (1970), allowing only women and married men to deduct expenses for
the care of dependents, was unconstitutional. Under the scrutiny required by Reed, the
classification, based solely on sex, was held to constitute an invidious discrimination
against never-married men. 469 F.2d at 470. Compare Getman, The Emerging Consti-
tutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. REv., 157 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Getman] and Sedler, The Legal Dimensions of Woniens Liberation: Ain Overview,
47 IND. L.J. 419 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sedler] with Ginsberg, Comment on Reed
v. Reed, 1 WOasxN's RIGHTS L. REP., Spring, 1972, at 7 (calling the Reed opinion a
"small, guarded step" forward).
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with Frontiero v. Richardson,3 challenging the sex classifications in the
federal statutes defining dependents and dependents' benefits for uni-
formed service personnel.54 Under these laws, in order for a woman in
the military to claim her husband as a dependent for purposes of obtaining
an increased housing allowance and medical and dental benefits, he must
receive over one-half of his support from his wife.55 On the other hand,
a wife of a serviceman is presumed dependent, as in OASDI, and is
automatically eligible for benefits. The plaintiff in Frontiero requested
dependents' benefits for her husband, a full-time student. His share of
their total expenses was $354 per month, but because he received $205 per
month in veterans' benefits, he did not meet the one-half support re-
quirement.
A three-judge panel sustained the statutory scheme, finding that the
distinction was not based solely on sex, as in Reed, but was based on sex
phis the specific relationship of the dependent individual to the service-
member." Looking for a "reasonable basis" upon which to uphold the
statute, the court pointed to the administrative burden which Congress
allegedly sought to avoid by establishing wives' presumptive depen-
dency."' The court reasoned that a presumption to facilitate adminis-
tration does not violate equal protection if it does not unduly burden or
oppress the class upon which it operates.55 The court found that the only
burden on women in this case was that married women were not allowed
to receive "windfall" payments which married men received by claiming
wives not in fact dependent."° This burden was not considered sufficiently
oppressive to void the statute.6'
The Supreme Court reversed the district panel and held that the
challenged statutes violated the due process clause insofar as they re-
quire a servicewoman to prove the dependency of her husband.62 Justice
Brennan joined by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall, found that
53. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
54. 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) ; 10 id. § 1072.
55. 37 id. § 401; 10 id. § 1072(2) (C).
56. 37 id. § 401; 10 id. § 1072(2) (A).
57. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 206, 209 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The court
noted that women in the armed services can claim unmarried, legitimate, minor children
for purposes of medical and dental benefits without a showing of dependency in fact.
Id. at 205-06. Judge Johnson dissented, finding the statutory classification based solely
on sex. He would declare the statutes unconstitutional on the basis of Reed, regarding
the rationale of administrative convenience as an insufficient rational basis to support
the classification. Id. at 209, 210.
58. Id. at 207.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 207-08.
61. Id. at 208.
62. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973).
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classifications based on sex, like those based on race, alienage and national
origin, are inherently suspect and must be subjected to close judicial
scrutiny.6" In abandoning the rational relationship test, previously ap-
plied to sex classifications, Justice Brennan cited Reed, characterizing
it as a "departure from 'traditional' rational basis analysis." '64 He based
his conclusion that sex is a suspect classification upon the pervasive, al-
though often subtle, discrimination against women, and upon the fact
that sex, like race, is an immutable characteristic determined by birth which
frequently bears no relation to one's ability to perform or contribute to
society.65 He also cited Reed as precedent for rejecting the govern-
ment's rationale of administrative convenience.6
Although eight Justices concurred in the Frontiero judgment,6
only four were willing to declare sex a suspect classification." Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, declined
to characterize sex as a suspect classification "with all the far-reaching
implications of such a holding."69 Justice Powell preferred to decide the
case on the authority of Reed, reserving for the future any expansion of
its rationale."0 In addition, because the Equal Rights Amendment had
been submitted by Congress to the states for ratification, he thought that
the adoption of the strict scrutiny test for sex classificaton would pre-
empt "by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in
process of resolution."'" Justice Stewart joined neither Justice Bren-
nan's nor Justice Powell's opinion, but simply concurred in the judgement
on the basis of Reed.
63. Id. at 688.
64. Id. at 684.
65. Id. at 686.
66. Id. at 690.
67. Justice Rehnquist dissented for the reasons given by the district court. Id. at
691.
68. Two lower federal courts and two state courts, however, have previously
reached the conclusion that sex is a suspect classification. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,
5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) ; State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 282
A.2d 748 (1971) ; cf. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn.
1968), which examined a sex distinction in a criminal statute under the "strict scrutiny"
standard, and found the sex classification to constitute invidious discriminaton. In Thorn
v. Richardson, 4 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PACTICES CAS. 299 (W.D. Wash. 1971),
women plaintiffs attacked the referral system of the federally administered Work In-
centive Program (WIN), which under federal regulations gives preference to un-
employed male welfare recipients over unemployed female recipients. The court held
that the sex classifications were suspect, encroached upon the plaintiff's fundamental
rights, and were without rational basis as is required by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Id. at 302.
69. 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 691.
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The judgment in Frontiero eliminated the requirement that service
women prove the dependency of their husbands, resulting in the extension
of the presumption of dependency to all spouses regardless of sex. The
one-half support requirement struck down in Frontiero is identical to
that found in the husband's and widower's social security benefits."'
Thus, Frontiero should lead the Court to hold Social Security's male
support requirements unconstitutional, and extend to men the presump-
tion of dependency continued in the wife's and widow's benefits. Exten-
sion of the dependency presumption would mean that a husband or
widower would automatically receive whichever benefit was greater, his
own or a derivative benefit based upon his wife's wage record. 4
In addition, Frontiero can be used as the basis for arguing that the
lack of a father's benefit" constitutes discrimination as invidious as the
presumptive dependency rules. Because Social Security makes no prov-
ision for a father's benefit, a mother's employment results in less financial
protection for her family than a father's employment. If a working mother
dies or becomes disabled, fathers are penalized by the lack of any bene-
fit to replace either the mother's contribution to the family income or her
provision of household or childcare services."'
73. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c) (1) (C), (f) (1) (D) (1970) with 37 id. § 401
and 10 id. § 1072(2) (C). The Social Security Act also includes a one-half support re-
quirement in the dependent benefit for a worker's parents, but the parents' provision
makes no distinction on the basis of sex; it applies equally to male and female workers,
and to male and female parents. 42 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1) (B) (1970).
74. Even the 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security recognized that the value
of social insurance protection for dependents was lower for working women than for
working men, due to the support requirement that husbands and widowers must meet to
receive benefits on a woman's wage record. The Advisory Council pointed out, how-
ever, that this lower value of dependents' protection was offset by the greater value of
the working woman's retirement benefit resulting from women's greater longevity. 1971
ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 25, at 63.
As the Court noted in Frontiero, the statutes requiring proof of support by hus-
bands are not in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against
women. 411 U.S. at 689 n.22. Frontiero can be distinguished from Gruenwald v. Gard-
ner, 390 F.2d 591, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968). Gruenwald upheld a sex classifica-
tion in OASDI because the provision in question worked to the advantage of women in
reducing the existing monetary disparity between male and female worker's benefits.
Id. at 592. Although not designed with affirmative action in mind, the age differentials
previously found in the computation provisions may have been able to pass a strict judi-
cial scrutiny test as a means of promoting equality for women. See Getman, supra note
52, at 165-66; Sedler, supra note 52, at 454.
75. See notes 36-40 supra & text accompanying.
76. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Civil No. 268-73
(D.NJ., filed Feb., 1973) is a class action challenging the denial of a "mother's" benefit
to a father who has in his care an eligible child. The plaintiff's wife had been a school
teacher for seven years. She contributed fully to social security and earned substan-
tially more than her husband until her death in childbirth. The plaintiff husband quali-
fied for benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970) in all respects except his sex.
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OASDI As Measured by the Public Policy of Title VII
Although OASDI, as a federal retirement plan, is not covered by
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the commitment to sexual
equality expressed in title VIF7 lends support to a court finding Social
Security's sex classifications unconstitutional under Frontiero. Justice
Brennan, in finding sex a suspect classification in Frontiero, referred to
title VII and noted that
Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon
sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal
branch of Government is not without significance."8
Title VII bans discrimination in "conditions of employment" which has
been construed to include retirement and death benefit plans.7" Although
title VII is not applicable to OASDI, its sex-based benefit structure would
be illegal if OASDI were an arrangement between private employers and
employees.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which
enforces title VII, in its guidelines on sex discrimination, has declared
that benefits conditioned on "head of household" or "principle wage
earner" status will be found prima facie violations.8" The Guidelines
also prohibit employers from establishng benefits for wives and families
of male employees where the same benefits are not available for the
husbands and families of female employees.8 ' In litigation involving a
private retirement plan, the EEOC held that an employer's death benefit
plan similar to OASDI violated title VII by providing for mandatory
payments to the surviving wife of a deceased worker, while paying bene-
fits to a deceased worker's husband only if he was physically or mentally
incapable of self-support.8 2 The employer argued that the death benefits
did not discriminate on the basis of sex, but were based upon the fact that
married women were generally supported by their husbands and had
77. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discrimin-
ate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970).
78. 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973).
79. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 939 (1971); Rosen v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (N.J. 1970),
aff'd, 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(c) (1973).
81. Id. § 1604.9(d).
82. CCH 1973 EEOC DEc. 6050, at 4083 (1969).
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fewer obligations to support others."5 In rejecting this defense, the
EEOC held such presumptions based on the collective characteristics of
a sexual group were without merit because title VII was intended to
protect individuals from the penalizing effects of stereotypes based on
sex. 
8 4
Title VII lends support to the argument that Social Security's sex
classification may no longer be viewed as a permissible method of meet-
ing the welfare and income security goals of OASDI. What is important
to these goals is the economic role assumed by each spouse, not the
spouse's sex. It would be highly anamolous for a court to decide that the
sex classifications of OASDI meet either the rational relationship or the
compelling state interest tests, when such classifications are not allowed
in employment plans within the private sector.
Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on OASDI
Finally, another legal tool that could be used to eliminate OASDI's
sex classification would be the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) to the Constitution."5 The simple theory of the ERA is that sex
would no longer be a permissible basis for statutory classification."6 The
fact that members of one sex are more likely than members of the other
sex to perform particular functions would not "authorize the Government
83. Id. at 4084.
84. Id. Another plan which paid death benefits only to surviving spouses of male
employees, excluding female employees, was also found to violate title VII. CCH 1973
EEOC DEC. % 6114, at 4206 (1970). A group health insurance plan, which required that
an employee be a "head of household" to be eligible for benefits, was also rejected by the
EEOC. CCH 1973 EEOC DEc. 1 6009, at 4026 (1969). In that case married males
were assumed to be "heads," while married women as a group were assigned to an in-
eligible status. Again, the EEOC stated that such benefits could not be based on general
assumptions regarding females as a group, including the employer's assumption that any
working female was dependent upon her husband for support, regardless of the extent
to which she contributes to the actual support and maintenance of her family. Id.
85. The Equal Rights Amendment reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
Sec. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratifica-
tion.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ; SJ. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
As of April, 1973, 30 states had ratified the amendment; 38 states are required for adop-
tion. The states have until March, 1979 to ratify the proposed twenty-seventh amend-
ment 1 WomEN's RIGHTS L. RE,., Spring, 1973, at 104.
86. SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, EQuAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AN ) WOMEN, S.
REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT] ;
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Ainendnwnt: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women., 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Equal Rights].
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to fix legal rights or obligations on the basis of membership in one sex."' s
Under this rationale, legislative classification is permissible in "situa-
tion[s] where a physical characteristic unique to one sex is involved"88
or where personal privacy is essential."9 Otherwise, the proposed amend-
ment would require that legal distinctions be made on the basis of char-
acteristics or functions common to both sexes.
Consequently, under the ERA, all spouses would be eligible for
social security benefits on equal terms." The male and female dependent
spouse benefits could be reconciled in two ways: either by eliminating
the presumption or by extending the presumption of dependency to hus-
bands and widowers, as in Frontiero.9" The dependency presumption
could be eliminated by requiring women to prove that they receive one-
half of their support from their husbands. This would be the least desir-
able alternative since forcing wives to prove receipt of support would
increase the complexity of an already intricate system and would prolifer-
ate litigation.92 Thus, the preferrable alternative under the ERA would
be to extend Social Security's presumptive dependency to men so that
husbands and widowers would be eligible on the same basis as wives and
widows. Extension would result in the least change in the present
system."2
87. SENATE REPORT, supra note 86, at 11-12.
88. Equal Rights, supra note 86, at 890.
89. SENATE REPORT, supra note 86, at 12.
90. Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, in her testimony in hearings on the ERA,
used the social security provisions based on the sex of the spouse as examples of the im-
pact the ERA would have on federal as well as state laws. Hearings in Equal Rights for
Men and Women Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1971). In the debate on the floor of the Senate prior to passage of
the ERA, Senator Fong introduced a letter from HEW Secretary Richardson listing in-
stances of the Social Security Act's differential treatment based on sex which would be
affected by the ERA. 118 CONG. REc. 4404 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972).
91. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973). Under title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended (Supp. II, 1972), em-
ployers would also have the alternative of extending a benefit to both sexes on the same
terms, or of eliminating it. In addition, the Equal Rights Amendment would require that
the present benefit for a mother of an eligible child be extended to fathers, and that
divorced men be eligible for benefits on the same basis as divorced wives and widows.
92. Such litigation has continually occurred under the previously existing one-half
support requirement for divorced wives. Social Security Amendments of July 30, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308, 79 Stat. 375-77. Including a one-half support requirement for
wives might also deny coverage to women who work outside the home, but are not
covered by social security or any other federal retirement plan, such as some domestic
workers. In 1972, 500,000 domestic workers were not covered by OASDI. 36 Soc. SEC.
BULL., Mar., 1973, at 75 (Table Q-2).
93. Currently, many more women than men are drawing benefits as dependents and
would be affected by the addition of a support requirement for women. As of June,
1972, 6,990,000 women were drawing benefits as wives and widows. 35 Soc. SEC. BuLL.,
Dec., 1972, at 76-78 (Tables Q-7 to -10). Only 11,695 husbands and widowers were
currently drawing benefits as dependents, and although it is difficult to estimate how
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If the social security benefit provisions are extended through ap-
plication of the Equal Rights Amendment or the equal protection and due
process clauses, enabling men to receive benefits on the same terms as
women, these modifications would probably not create many additional
beneficiaries or increase the size of payments. Men's rates of employment,
average earnings and average PIA will remain higher than women's
until employment discrimination against women ends. However, elim-
ination of the current sex classifications would be significant in altering
the present expectations implicit in the Act that all husbands are primary
breadwinners and all wives are at best secondary earners. It would pro-
vide equal benefits for those couples who voluntarily choose to differ from
the accepted norm, or who are forced to adopt nontraditional patterns for
financial reasons. After modification, the statutory scheme would be
sex-neutral on its face: the primary family earner would receive a
workers' benefit, and the spouse, regardless of sex, would receive a deri-
vative benefit if she or he had a PIA less than one-half of the primary
earner's.
A STEP BEYOND ELIMINATION OF SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
Abolishing the sex classifications in OASDI will not alter the status
of economic dependency which is a reality for many, if not most, women.
A larger proportion of women will continue to receive a derivative
spouse's benefit, based on their husbands' PIA, rather than their own
worker's benefit. The perpetuation of women's dependent status through
the social security system is regarded by many as a continued form of
second-class treatment, ignoring women's productive contribution to
society through their work as housewives and mothers.9 Because many
women do not work for money, they are unable to earn social security
credits. Nevertheless, their Work needs to be recognized as indispensible
and as worthy of protection against the risks of death and disability. The
social security system, by making benefits entirely dependent on sub-
stantial prior attachment to the work force, perpetuates society's dis-
many additional men would be able to qualify under the present wife's benefit rules, it
is not likely to be a substantial number. If Congress is concerned about dual entitle-
ment to benefits, see notes 30-32 sipra & text accompanying, it could easily add a provi-
sion reducing a spouse's benefit by the amount received under another federal retirement
system, or by giving a spouse the option of electing one of the two available benefits.
94. See HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at 91-92; Walker, Sex Discrimination in Gov-
erment Benefit Programs, 23 HAsTNGs LJ. 277 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Walker].
Walker refers to the homemaker "Black-out Period," pointing out that a housewife is
not eligible for any kind of federal cash assistance between the time her last child leaves
home and the time she reaches age 62. Walker, supra, at 278. Social Security offers
no protection to a housewife against her own death or disability, and provides no re-
placement benefit to meet her family's increased costs of house and child care.
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regard for those who do not work for pay. To encourage the treatment
of women as equals and to provide minimum protection for homemakers
against disability and death, the social security system should be revised
to protect homemakers as primary workers.
Women's work patterns often vary from the patterns considered
normal for most men. Although a majority of women work for wages
at some point during their lives, many withdraw from the work force for
varying lengths of time in order to bear and raise children. 5 Because
computation of a person's PIA is based on a certain length of continumos
work, interrupted work patterns and periods of part-time employment
are major reasons many women do not receive their own social security
benefits, even though they have accumulated social security credits. 6
Coverage of homemakers as workers would allow women to maintain a
continuous work record throughout their productive years, and the multi-
ple roles women play as workers and child rearers would no longer
penalize them in terms of accumulated benefits."
One concrete legislative proposal has been developed to provide
primary coverage of homemakers. House Bill 252, introduced on January
3, 1973,98 would extend social security coverage to an individual who
resides with, and maintains a household for, another employed or self-
employed person. Monthly wages equal to the national average monthly
wage for employment in service occupations would be deemed to have
been paid to the individual for such "householder service." 9 If the house-
holder was also employed part-time, she or he would be covered as a house-
holder as long as the earned wages were insufficient to meet the minimum
requirements for regular coverage.' 0 General revenue funds would be used
to finance this additional coverage.' The provisions make no distinc-
tions on the basis of sex, so that men as well as women would be free to
adopt dual roles if they chose to do so.
In the past, the major objections leveled against the coverage of
95. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 7-8.
96. Bixby, supra note 11, at 9.
97. An individual work record would also reduce the risk attendant upon divorce,
as benefits would not be based on marital status; a wife would no longer lose all accu-
mulated social security protection if her marriage had not lasted twenty years. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 402(b) (1) (H), 416(d) (1)-(2) (1970).
98. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill was introduced by Representatives Abzug,
Badillo, Conyers, Harrington, Podell, and Tiernan, and was referred to the Committee
on Ways and Means. As of September, 1973, it was still languishing in the committee.
WOMEN's EQUITY ACTION LEAGUE, WASHINGTON REPORT No. 14 (1973).
99. H.R. 252, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 232(c) (1973).
100. Id. § 232(b) (4). For minimum requirements of coverage as a worker see note
8 sipra.
101. H.R. 252, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973).
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homemaking services have been the practical difficulties of imputing a
monetary value to unpaid work, and the related question of who should
pay the payroll tax "contribution" to finance the additional benefits.'02
House Bill 252 avoids these two problems by using the national average
wage for service workers to impute value and general revenue funds to
finance benefits. Similar questions were answered in 1939 when the
original provisions for dependent's benefits were passed, enlarging the
welfare aspects of Social Security and departing from a strict insurance
model.' Neither married men nor their wives were at that time asked to
meet the additional costs of the wife's and widow's benefits; they were
financed by all who paid the payroll tax. 4 The problem of imputed value
was avoided by making the benefits dependent on the husband's earn-
ings. 5 Today, however, recognizing the regressive nature of the payroll
tax, '0 general revenue financing is preferrable to higher payroll tax rates.
House Bill 252 does not provide for elimination of any of the pre-
sent dependent's benefits, but would merely add an alternative benefit.
If a wife is eligible to receive a derivative dependent's benefit higher than
the household worker's benefit, she would be allowed to do so."' Thus,
with House Bill 252, the Social Security Act would incorporate two views
of homemakers by according them status as workers, in addition to re-
cognizing their economic dependency.
CONCLUSION
Social security coverage of homemakers as workers would constitute
a major expansion of the system, approaching universal protection for
102. See PREsinEN's CommissioN, supra note 3, at 37; Bixby, supra note 11, at 10.
103. REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SEcuan"v BD., H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1939).
104. Id. at 5-7, 11-12.
105. Social Security Amendments of August 10, 1939, ch. 666, § 202(b), 53 Stat.
1364 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2) (1970)).
106. See generally BRITTAIN, spra note 2.
107. Although not provided for in H.R. 252, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), the house-
holder service benefit should also set the minimum benefit level, so as not to penalize
those who are forced to work for wages below the average service worker's wage. The
householder service benefit would form a floor below which benefits would not be al-
lowed to fall. The national average monthly wage in service occupations was approxi-
mately $447 as of March 1973. 19 EMPLOYMENT & EARNiNGS, June, 1973, at 86 (Table
C-2). The average hourly pay for service occupations was listed at $3.30 and average
weekly pay was $111.87.
H.RR 252 would not be the only possible way to extend primary coverage to home-
makers. An alternative method of coverage could be worked out by splitting combined
family earnings, attributing a portion to each spouse as her or his own earnings, and in
that way establishing individual wage records that would survive the marriage. If "pay-
roll" contributions from homemakers were regarded as necessary, they could be made
through the federal income tax reporting system. See J. PECHMAN, H. AARON & M.
TAussiG, SOCIAL SEcuDITY-PERsPEcrIws FOR REFoRm 188-91 (1968).
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all persons over age 62 against the risks of retirement, death and disability.
With the elimination of sex classifications as a relevant basis upon which
to condition benefits, the system would remain tied to the economic or
productive functions of individuals. Because social security benefits are
derived from an average monthly wage, however, women will continue
to receive lower benefits than men, whether as workers or householders,
as long as women are generally discriminated against in hiring, pro-
motion and pay.
There is no way of eliminating this more subtle and indirect dif-
ferential impact on women unless social security benefits are divorced
from previous work experience. However, such a major revision in the
concept of Social Security is highly unlikely. Short of such sweeping
legislative reform of Social Security, the conversion of the present bene-
fit structure into a sex-neutral statutory framework is necessary in order
for Social Security to accomodate present changes in family roles and the
increasing economic participation of women.
MARTHA S. WEST
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